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Abstract

A leaning-against-the-wind intervention that has only a temporary effect on the exchange
rate and that is not too aggressive can be shown analytically to yield positive expected
profits to a central bank even when the exchange-rate process is non-stationary. These
profits arise if there are some transitory shocks to the exchange rate. Furthennore. very
aggressive intervention will yield positive expected profits eventually when there is a
tendency for exchange rates to return to a long-run equilibrium level

Leaning Against The Wind:

Do Central Banks Necessarily Lose?

1. Introduction
Central banks often justify interventions in foreign exchange markets on the grounds that
they are countering "disorderly markets." A sudden drop in the price of foreign exchange
may be slowed or stopped by a central-bank purchase of the foreign currency.

If the

decrease is only transitory, the bank can later sell the foreign exchange at a profit when the
price has gone back up. This line of reasoning led Milton Friedman (1953) to argue that
stabilizing intervention should be profitable for a central bank. A policy of buying when low
and selling when high moderates the extent to which exchange rates vary and at the same
time is profitable for the central bank. Conversely, if the central bank loses money from its
interventions, Friedinan would view that as an indication of destabilizing intervention in the
sense of keeping the exchange rate away from its equilibrium level

In a provOCative paper, Dean Taylor (1982) examines whether central banks did or
did not make profitable interventions. Using data from nine countries from the beginning of
general floating in the early 1970's until the end of 1979, he found that most central banks
lost money from their interventions and for some the losses were significant

Taylor.

following up on Friedman's ideas. argues that when a pennanent economic shock causes the
equilibrium exchange rate to shift. a "leaning-against-the-wind" policy will lose money. For
example, if the equilibrium price of foreign exchange is falling a central-bank purchase of
foreign exchange will keep the price from falling as fast as it would without intervention, but
the central bank in effect loses on the transaction when the price later falls below the
purchase price. The bank may have succeeded in moderating the rate of change in the
exchange rate but, since the price has been kept away from its equilibrium, the loss sustained
by the central bank signals destabilizing (or anti-stabilizing) intervention. In light of the
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losses by central banks, Taylor suggests that private speculators could make money and serve
a stabilizing role by betting against the central bank.
The estimated profits or losses sustained by central banks tum out to be sensitive to
the time period chosen for the calculations. To avoid the problems of measuring inventory
gains or losses, other researchers have restricted attention to periods in which net
intervention is small. Victor Argy (1982), for example, restricts his calculations to periods
in which purchases of foreign exchange are approximately equal to sales.

A Bank of

England study (1983) provides evidence that the intervention by the Bank of England tended
to yield profits, most convincingly in periods of nearly zero net intervention. Lawrence
Jacobsen (1983) calculates the profitability of US intervention in DM.

While the

intervention appears unprofitable over periods in which cumulative net intervention is
substantial, the results are more positive if one examines the entire period and subperiods in
which net intervention was near zero.
Charles Corrado and Dean Taylor (1986) are critical of the studies that restrict the
sample to periods over which cumulative net intervention is zero and argue that this
introduces a positive bias to expected profits. By a similar line of reasoning, one could argue
that studies of almost any realization of profits from intervention are subject to the charge of
bias relative to expected profits. Taylor's calculations of profits, for example, were over a
period in the 1970's in which the dollar realized substantial depreciation. The central banks
by buying dollars had accumulated reserves with a market value at the end of the sample
period well below the purchase price. For most patterns that might have reasonably been
anticipated ex ante, this particular end-of-sample realization surely fell below the expected
price of the dollar.
What is neat about Corrado and Taylor's contribution is that they calculate expected
profits based on assumptions about (a) the movements in exchange rates that would have
occurred in the absence of intervention, (b) the intervention rule utilized, and (c) the effects
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of intervention. Specifically, they assume that the exchange rate would have followed a
random walk in the absence of intervention and prove that a leaning-against-the-wind
intervention policy can expect negative profits.
We follow up this analysis by considering two other possibilities. The fIrst begins
with the observation that there can be both pennanent and transitory changes in the exchange
rate. The bank: would want to offset the transitory changes and ignore the pennanent ones,

but if the bank: cannot immediately tell one type of change from the other, should it intervene
or not? To provide an analytic answer, we can introduce a first-order moving-average
process for the exchange rate in the absence of intervention The moving-average parameter
-

represents the extent to which exchange-rate changes are transitory. Although this is, like a
random walk, a nonstationary process, we show that there is scope for profitable
intervention.
The second possibility considered is based on the observation that exchange rates
appear to move in long waves, with periodic returns to what may be considered long-run
equilibrium levels.

Consequently, we shall also explore the expected profitability of a

leaning-against-the-wind intervention policy when the exchange rate follows a first-order
autoregressive process in the absence of intervention.

Again, profitable intervention is

possible.
2. The Model

To set the stage for our own analysis, we initially reproduce several elements of the
specification used by Corrado and Taylor (1986). Asswne first that the intervention rule is
the following leaning-against-the-wind policy:
(1)

where 5 t = the observed spot exchange rate, and
It = net purchases of foreign exchange by the central bank.
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The parameter A. indicates the extent of the intervention in response to a change in the spot
exchange rate. Assume A. > O. A positive value of It denotes a purchase of foreign exchange
and a negative value a sale. So the central bank buys foreign currency when the price falls
and sells when the price rises. A substantial body of empirical work fmds that the major
explanatory variable for official intervention is the change in the exchange rate. Some of
this is cited by Corrado and Taylor. A recent survey by Geert Almekinders and Sylvester
Eijffinger (1991) suggests similar results. While evidence of asynunetry in responses under
different situations emerges in some studies, interventions still frequently appear to lean
against the wind.
Assume next that intervention h~ a temporary effect on the exchange rate:
(2)

where Ft = the "free" exchange rate in the absence of intervention. According to equation
(2), intervention changes the spot exchange rate from what it would have been, but there is
no permanent effect The parameter a

~

0 denotes the strength of the effect of intervention.

When the central bank buys foreign exchange the price will be temporarily higher (assuming

a > 0) than it would have been without the intervention, and when the bank sells foreign
exchange the price will be temporarily lower.

Alrnekinders and Eijffinger (1991) also

survey several empirical studies assessing the effects of intervention. There appears to be
virtually no evidence that sterilized intervention can make a permanent change in the
exchange rate through a portfolio balance effect, but there is some evidence of short term
effects in daily data that die out in the course of a month.
The net profit

1t

from central bank transactions in the foreign exchange market from

time 1 to N is defmed as the difference between the net accumulated reserves valued at the
end-of-period rate and their initial cost:
N
1t =

N

FN L ~ - L S~
t=l

t=l

(3)
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When the sum of the interventions is zero, profits arc positive if the purchases (with It
positive) occur at a lower average price than the sales (when It is negative). When the sum
of the accumulations is non-zero, then one must also take into account the valuation gains or
losses by valuing the stocks at the end-of-period free rate relative to the purchase or sale
prices at which the interventions took place. Equation (3) taken from Corrado and Taylor
accomplishes this valuation.
To express profits in terms of the free exchange rate, which will be assumed to be
given exogenously, substitute for St from equation (2) into the profit equation (3) and note
that FN - Ft = ~N +

~N-l + ••• +~t+l

N

N-l

for t < N , where

1:==1

-

= Ft - Ft_1•

The result is:

N

L~ L~j-aL~2

7t=

~t

ifN> 1

1:==1

j=t+l

w: 12

(4)

ifN= 1

With successive substitutions of equations (1) and (2), It can be written as:
00

It = (- ep/a)

L epk~t_k

(5)

k=O
where ep = aIJ(l + aA) < 1. Equation (5) can then be substituted into (4) to get profits that
will result from the intervention policy as a function of changes in the free exchange rate.

Corrado and Taylor assume that the free exchange rate follows a random walk:
(6)

where the ut are independently and identically distributed random variables with a mean of
zero and a variance of dl. They then prove that the exPected profit E(7t) is always negative
as long as the central bank's intervention can affect the exchange rate (a> 0). If a = 0 and if
the exchange rate follows a random walk, the central bank's expected profits are zero. We
will replace the random walk assumption of equation (6) with two alternatives, both of which

contain the random walk as a special case.
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3.

Intervention with a Moving Average Process

Consider the following moving average process:

Ft = F t- 1 + ut - 9 ut-1

(7)

where ut is an unobserved exogenous shock, with the properties previously assumed. The
parameter 9 indicates the degree to which the shocks are transitory. If 9 = 0, the _level of F is
permanently changed by u. This would be the case of a random walk.

If 9 = 1, the

effect of a shock disappears fully after one period and the shocks are entirely transitory. For
any 9 in between there is a mixture of permanent and transitory shocks. 9 ut is transitory
and (1 - 9) ut is pennanent.

In a discussion of empirical regularities iIi the behavior of exchange rates, Michael
Mussa (1979, p. 11) notes that typically for monthly data a "flI'St-order moving average
process gives a slightly better explanation of the data than the model that assumes that ut is
serially uncorrelated." According to Mussa, estimates of 9 are generally between 0 and .2.
Using extremely high-frequency data, Takatoshi Ito and Vance Roley (1986) and Charles
Goodhart and L. Figliuoli (1991) report that large exchange rate jumps are partially reversed
within a day.

And in a recent study, Martin Evans and James Lothian (1993) find a

statistically significant role for transitory shocks, in exchange rate movements and report
instances in which temporary shocks made a substantial contribution. These studies suggest
one should not dismiss the existence of both permanent and transitory shocks in exchange
rate movements An analytically tractable way to handle this is to assume a fIrst-order
moving average process.
With 9 < 1, the process specified by equation (7) is non-stationary over time. If only
the net effects of the shocks are considered, then the process can be viewed as a random
walk, as if there were a series of cumulative shocks of (1 - 9)

ute

We examine whether or not

leaning-against-the-wind intervention, as asswned in equation (1), can be expected to
generate positive profits if the free rate follows this moving-average process.
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As shown in the appendix, expected profits are:

() -~.~.
~a(I-q»
a

(8)

E7t-

cr

Note that for 6 = 0, which is the case of a random walk, E(7t) =-Nq>2 /[a(1--4>2)] < O. This
is the result obtained by Corrado and Taylor. More generally, if q>
any

N.

~

6 then E(1t) < 0 for

If the extent of the intervention is too great relative to the moving-average

parameter,

the

central

bank

can

expect

losses

from

the

intervention.

If q> < 6, the first tenn in (8) increases with N. Therefore, E(7t) will be positive for
any N> 6(1 - ~2)/[(6 - ~)(1- 6~)] = N*.. When

e is positive, a central bank can always

have positive expected profits by choosing the coefficient of the leaning against the wind (1..)
in equation (1) so that·~ < 6 for any N > N*. From the definition of ~, this holds if a)J(1 +
aA) < 6 or if

(9)

A. < 6/[a(1 - 6)].
.

The central bank has more flexibility in its choice of a profitable A. when the effect of the
intervention (a) is smaller and when 6 is larger, i.e., when the transitory shocks are larger
relative to the pennanent shocks.
To help get an intuitive grasp on this result, consider Figure 1. Based on infonnation
through observations available up to and including time t-1, there is an expected value of the
free exchange rate in period 1. This is depicted by the point denoted by Et-lF t in the figure.

Suppose in the absence of intervention, the exchange rate would fall to the point Ft. Given
the assumed moving average process, the expected value at time t for PH1 is given by the
following adaptive-expectations formula:

The upward sloping line in Figure 1 represents equation (2) and shows the assumed
temporary tradeoff between the amount of intervention and the observed exchange rate. As
long as St is below

~FH1,

the central bank: is buying foreign exchange at a price below its

Exchange·
Rate

Et-1 Ft
Et Ft+1

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I .
I
I

.It

Extent of
Intervention

Figure 1. Opportunity for Profitable Intervention
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expected value next period and this is essentially how it can make an expected profit. The
scope for profitable ~tervention is increased by a larger 9 which would move ~Ft+1 farther
from Ft , and by a lower a which would mean a flatter line representing equation (2). This is
consistent with the analytic results discussed above in conjunction with inequality (9).
Our analysis has proceeded as if all the parameters arc known and the draws of the

free exchange rate always come from the process asswned in equation (7). If this were
generally known and the central,bank did not intervene to the extent that St

= ¥t+I' then

private speculators would presumably have an incentive to buy the currency when St <
~Ft+I' and sell the currency when St

> ~t+I' If speculative trades drive St into equality

with EtFt+I' then the best forecast of the next value of the free exchange rate is the current
exchange rate. This sort of infonned spec-ulation leads to the familiar theoretical claim that
the actual exchange rate will follow a random walk.
What we have in mind is addressing a different question. Suppose central banks
mechanically follow a frequently assumed leaning-against-the-wind intervention rule and
amid the noise in exchange rate movements there is a mixture of permanent and transitory
shocks, represented by a moving-average process which is not clearly perceived. Could the
mechanical intervention rule yield positive expected profits and hence satisfy Friedman's
,
criterion for stabilizing intervention? The answer is yes if the strength of the intervention
satisfies inequality (9).
Furthermore, as shown in the appendix:
Var(AS t) =:

~~

(I + a2 - 2ql9)a2 ~ (I + a2)a2 = Var(AFt)

A strict inequality holds if ell > O. Since

(10)

ell > 0 when the central bank leans against the wind

(A. > 0 ) and the intervention has some effect on the exchange rate (a > 0·), the central bank
can moderate the short-run variability of the exchange rate and have positive expected profits
forO

<ell < 8.
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4. Intervention with an Autoregressive Process
Plots of exchange rates over time between major currencies indicate clearly that there have
been long swings in the data. How this can be best modelled fonnally is still an open
question, but some form of mean reversion is frequently acknowledged. For example, John
Huizinga (1987, p. 208) writes: "...the long-run movements of real exchange rates differ
from those implied by a random walk by having a notable mean reverting compontent.

It

More recently, Jack Glen (1992) using variance ratio tests suggested by Andrea Lo and Craig
Mac~ay (1988)

rejects random walk behavior in favor of mean reversion with annual data

at lags greater than two years. Over shorter periods of time, however, these tests indicate
that exchange rates have what may be called mean aversion, a tendency to move away from
some long-run equilibrium significantly faster than a random walk would predict. This is
reported by Glen with monthly data and by Christina Liu and Jia He (1991) with weekly
data. A similar interpretation can be taken from the analysis by Charles Engle and James
Hamilton (1990), who argue that long swings in exchange rates can be modeled by an
underlying two state Markov chain. These and other empirical studies provide scope for a
variety of hypotheses one might choose to analyze the expected profitability of leaningagainst-the-wind intervention by central banks.
In what follows. we have worked out the results if the mean reverting tendencies are

modeled by a first-order autoregressive process in the absence of intervention.

Assume

therefore that the free exchange rate follows the following autoregressive process:
F t = OFt _l + lit

(11)

where 0 ~ 0 ~ l.
If 0 = 1, this would be a random walk. With 0 < 0 < 1, there is a gradual return to a

long-run value, which has been normalized to 0 in this formulation. As in the previous
section, .we investigate whether a mechanical leaning-against-the-wind policy can be
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profitable and if so, under what conditions. The derivations of expected profits and the
variance of the exchange rate in this case involve a lot of algebra and will be· sent to any
interested reader on request The result for expected profits is:
ifO~B<1

E(x) =

(12)

ifB=1
Note that when B = 1, the Corrado-Taylor result emerges again and leaning against the wind
cannot achieve positive expected profits.
For 0 ~ B< 1, however, E(x) -is positive if

.!..:.!.

1 - 8i
1 + ~ > N(I- B)

(13)

The right side of (13) asymptotically approaches zero as N gets larger. Therefore, no matter
how aggressively the central bank intervenes, Le., no matter how close

~

is to one, its

intervention can eventually achieve positive expected profits if the exchange rate follows a
stable autoregressive process in the absence of intervention.

It can also be shown that
.

var(as t) =

2(1 - tp)2a2
(1 + ~)(1 + B"-)-(1---~-

(14)

Recall that ~ = aJJ(1 + <Xl) where A. is the strength of the intervention and a is the effect of

the intervention. By choosing a large A. that puts

~

close to one, the central bank can

eliminate almost all variability in the exchange rate, if it has sufficient reserves, and still
expect long-run profitability from its intervention assuming B < 1, Le., assuming a long-run
mean-reverting tendency.
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5. Conclusions
We have shown that under a mechanical rule for intervention, positive expected profits arc
possible if the free exchange rate in the absence of intervention would have followed a firstorder moving-average process or a first-order autoregressive process.

These assumed

processes are not meant to represent precisely how exchange rates will move, and
interventions arc often sporadic rather than following a mechanical rule. The analyses do,
however, provide an antidote to the impression left by Corrado and Taylor that intervention
can necessarily be expected to lose money in the long run, with the implied interpretation
that central banks should have known better than to have intervened. The analysis with the
moving average process suggests that central-bank profits from responding to what are at
least in part transitory changes in the exchange rate can outweigh losses from the pennanent
changes even if the exchange-rate process is non-stationary. Furthennore, the analysis with
an autoregressive process suggests that even very aggressive leaning against the wind by the
central bank will yield positive expected profits eventually when there is a tendency for
exchange rates to return to a long-run equilibrium level
We should note that other analytical issues arise when central banks intervene to try
to defend exchange rate target-zone systems, such as the Bretton Woods System or the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism. In those cases, the issue becomes whether or for how
long the central banks can weather speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates when there
are divergent domestic policies. Our analysis applies more to regimes of managed floating
in which the central bank: is reacting to exogenous events in an attempt to moderate the
severity of observed exchange rate changes.
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Appendix: Derivation of Expected Profits
Taking the expected value of the profit function equation (4) in the text gives the
following expression, assuming N > 1.

E(1t)=E{~~
iAFraI~2}
t=l j=t+l
t=l

(AI)

With a moving average process for the free exchange rate, the following
autocovariances follow from equation (7) with Eu = 0 and Eu2 = dl-:
(I + 9l)dl

ifk=O

E(aFtAFl-0 = { ~ e,,2

ifk=l

(A2)

ifk>l
E(1t) from equation (AI) can be evaluated in two parts. The first term is:

N-l

=

L edl-~/a

= (N - l)e~dl-/a

(A3)

t=1

For the second term in E(1t) :

Eo;2)

=

E{~ (- +ta) ~aFl-k}

2

from (5)

00

=

(~/a)2

L {~2k(1 + el)dl- - ~2k+ledl-}
k=O

(A4)
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From (AI), (A3) and (A4),

N{~

=

E(n)

«(1- ~2)

a

=

=

~
~
«(1-~)

cr }_~

_ (1 +e2-2aC/»)+2

a

{6( 1 - +1 - (1 + e2 - 29C/»)C/»} -

~
a

~acl>a2
«(1- ep1
a

(AS)

This is reproduced as equation (8) in the text.
We next consider how the intervention affects the variance of changes in the
exchange rate. To do this, use equations (1) and (2) in the text to relate S to F and take first
differences. The result is:

AS t = + AS t-1 + (1 -~) AF"t

-

This implies:

k
AS t = (1 - ep) ~
~ ep AF"t-k
k=O

(A6)

It follows from (A6) and (A2) that:

Var(AS t) = (1- ep)2[

~ ep2kE(AF"t_k2) + i

k=O

=

(1 - ep)~a2
(1 _ ep) [(1 +

=

:

~~

+2k+1 ECAF"t_#t_k_1)]

k;()

02) - ~6]

(1 + e2 - ~e)~ S (1 + e2)a'l = Var(AF"t)

This is reproduced as (10) in the text.
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